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Executive Summary
The idea that children will grow up to be 
better off than their parents is a central 
component of the American Dream, and 
sustains American optimism. However, 
Downward Mobility from the Middle Class: 
Waking up from the American Dream finds 
that a middle-class upbringing does not 
guarantee the same status over the course 
of a lifetime.1 A third of Americans raised 
in the middle class—defined here as those 
between the 30th and 70th percentiles 
of the income distribution—fall out of 
the middle as adults. The data also show 
differences in rates of downward mobility 
from the middle based on both family 
background and personal characteristics. 
The research for this report was 
undertaken to answer critical questions 
about what accounts for downward 
mobility from the middle class, and how 
those factors influence people differently 
depending on their race and gender. Four 
main findings were identified:
Marital status, education, test scores 
and drug use have a strong influence 
on whether a middle-class child loses 
economic ground as an adult. 
In this era of two-worker families, both 
men and women who are divorced, 
widowed or separated are more likely to 
lose their middle-class status, as are never-
married men and women.  
■ Compared with married women, 
women who are divorced, widowed 
or separated are between 31 and 36 
percentage points more likely to fall 
down the economic ladder. In turn, 
never-married women are 16 to 19 
percentage points more likely to be 
downwardly mobile than married 
women.  
■ Men who are divorced, widowed or 
separated are 13 percentage points 
more likely to drop out of the middle 
class than are married men, and men 
who have never married are 6 to 10 
percentage points more likely to fall 
than married men.
Men and women raised in middle-class 
homes are generally more likely to fall 
out of the middle if they do not obtain 
education beyond high school.  
■ Women with a high school diploma 
or less who are raised in middle-class 
homes are between 14 and 16 
the pew Charitable trUsts2
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 percentage points more likely to be 
downwardly mobile than women 
who get a college degree. 
■ Men with no more than a high school 
diploma are 7 to 15 percentage 
points more likely to be downwardly 
mobile than men with just some 
postsecondary education but no 
bachelor’s degree. 
A relatively low score on the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which 
measures reading comprehension, math 
knowledge, arithmetic reasoning and word 
knowledge, correlates with downward 
mobility, as does the use of heroin or crack 
cocaine.
Race is a factor in who falls out of the 
middle class, but only for men. 
■ White, black and Hispanic women 
are equally likely to experience 
downward mobility out of the middle 
class, but 38 percent of black men 
fall out, compared with 21 percent 
of white men. Hispanic men also 
appear more likely than white men 
to fall from the middle as adults, 
but the difference is not statistically 
significant.
There is a gender gap in downward 
mobility from the middle, but it is 
driven entirely by a disparity between 
white men and white women. 
■ Only among whites are women more 
downwardly mobile than men: Thirty 
percent of white women fall out of 
the middle class, compared with 21 
percent of white men. Black women 
experience less downward mobility 
than black men, and Hispanic men 
and women have nearly identical 
chances of falling from the middle.    
Differences in average test scores are 
the most important observable racial 
difference in accounting for the large 
downward mobility gap between black 
men and white men, but none of the 
factors examined in the report sheds 
light on the gap between white men 
and white women.
■ Black men raised in middle-class 
families are 17 percentage points 
more likely to be downwardly 
mobile than are white men raised in 
the middle. Taking into account a 
range of personal and background 
characteristics—such as father’s 
occupational status, individual 
educational attainment and marital 
status—reduces this gap, but still 
leaves a sizable portion unexplained. 
However, taking into account 
differences in AFQT scores between 
middle-class white and black men 
reduces the gap until it is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.
■ On the other hand, even after 
accounting for personal and 
background differences, the gap 
between white men and white 
women remains almost completely 
unexplained. 
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In January 2009, the Economic Mobility 
Project (EMP) commissioned a public 
opinion poll to assess Americans’ 
perceptions of their own economic 
mobility and opportunity and the 
mobility prospects of future generations.  
When asked to define the American 
Dream, one of the more popular options 
chosen was “your children being 
financially better off than you.”2 Indeed, 
the promise of each generation doing 
better than the one that came before it is 
a founding principle of our country and 
sustains American optimism. 
Defining middle class as those between 
the 30th and 70th percentiles of the 
income distribution, this report finds 
Introduction
that a third of Americans raised in the 
middle class fall down the income ladder 
as adults.3 What’s more, the data show 
differences in rates of downward mobility 
based on both family background and 
personal characteristics.
What accounts for downward mobility 
from the middle class, and how do 
those factors influence people differently 
depending on their race and gender?  
What might explain differences in 
downward mobility by race and gender?  
Using survey data that tracks Americans 
from youth into adulthood, this report 
explores these questions to better 
understand why the American Dream 
eludes some in the middle class.
percentiles. Using the 30th percentile 
as the lower bound for middle-income 
status has some appeal—it is around the 
income level at which most individuals 
are ineligible for public-assistance 
programs for low-income families and, 
as such, the life experiences of those just 
above and just below the cutoff may be 
qualitatively different. 
A family’s income is adjusted for family 
size by dividing it by the poverty line for 
the family. The poverty line measures a 
family’s needs; it varies by family size and 
composition. In these data, those raised 
in middle-class families had income-
to-needs ratios from 1.70 to 3.37 (the 
30th to 70th percentiles). This definition 
of middle class roughly translates to 
income from about $32,900 to $64,000 
in 2010 dollars for a family with two 
adults and two children (see Figure 1). 
This report draws from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 
1979 cohort, focusing on youth who 
were age 14-17 in 1979 and who lived 
in their parents’ homes in 1979 and 
1980.4 Their economic status was then 
assessed in 2004 and 2006, when they 
were between the ages of 39 and 44.5 The 
sample is divided into three racial groups: 
Non-Hispanic whites (including a small 
number of people who are not white, 
black or Hispanic); non-Hispanic blacks; 
and Hispanics.  
The middle-class group is defined as 
those falling between the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of the family-size-adjusted 
income distribution. This is a broader 
definition of “middle class” than that 
used in EMP’s 2008 report, Getting Ahead 
or Losing Ground: Economic Mobility in 
America, which defined “middle income” 
as falling between the 40th and 60th 
Data and Definitions
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to be downwardly mobile. On the other 
hand, it does consider someone who drops 
from the 69th to the 49th percentile to be 
downwardly mobile, even though the 
person in this example remains squarely 
in the middle of the income distribution as 
an adult.  
Both of these definitions are based on 
relative mobility—where one stands 
relative to one’s peers in the income 
distribution, compared with where one’s 
parents stood relative to their peers.  
However, since living standards have 
improved over time due to economic 
growth, even a youth who is worse off 
Defining the Middle Class
The Income Range of the Middle Class has Shifted Significantly Over the Past Generation
Figure 1
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NOTE: Income calculated for family of four. Cut points defining the middle class are based on income adjusted for family size. 
A family’s income is divided by the federal poverty line corresponding to its size and composition (e.g., number of adults and 
number of children). The dollar amounts in the figure are the result of multiplying the size-adjusted cut points by the federal 
poverty line for a family of four (two children and two adults). The cut point amounts for each generation (measured in 1979 
and in 2004 and 2006) are then adjusted to reflect purchasing power in 2010, using the Personal Consumption Expenditure 
deflator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Measures  of Mobility 
Three measures are used to assess the 
downward mobility of youth raised in 
middle-class families. The first defines 
downward mobility as the share of 
middle-class youth who fall below the 
30th percentile of the income distribution 
when they are 39- to 44-year-olds.6 The 
second measure considers adults to be 
downwardly mobile if their income rank is 
20 or more percentiles below their parents’ 
rank in 1978-79.  Unlike the first measure, 
this measure does not consider someone 
who drops from the 31st percentile as a 
child to the 29th percentile as an adult 
DATA  AnD DEfInITIonS
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size-adjusted income is more than 20 
percent below their parents’ income. 
These three measures are interrelated 
but capture different facets of mobility, 
and considering all three gives a more 
complete picture of who is downwardly 
mobile from the middle and why. 
DATA  AnD DEfInITIonS
relative to his peers than his parents 
were might be materially better off 
than his parents. To address this issue, 
the analyses use a third measure that 
assesses downward absolute mobility: 
adults who started out in the middle 
class are considered downwardly 
mobile if their inflation- and family-
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of their parents at a similar age—the third 
measure of downward mobility. 
While the mobility findings do reflect 
what one would expect to see in terms 
of mathematical chances of leaving the 
middle class, not all middle-class children 
are equally likely to fall. As the remainder 
of this report shows, there are notable 
differences in downward mobility based 
on both family background and individual 
choices.
If growing up in the middle class did not 
confer any advantages to children, then 
one would expect that 30 percent of them 
would end up in the bottom 30 percent 
of families as adults. That is to say, no 
matter what their parents’ income was, 
everyone—rich, poor or middle class—
would have the same chance of being in 
the bottom 30 percent. Thirty percent of 
adults raised in rich families would end 
up there, 30 percent of adults raised in 
poor families, and 30 percent of those 
raised in middle-class families. 
In fact, at least for adults raised in 
middle-class families, that is basically 
what happened—28 percent of adults 
whose parents were in the middle class 
fell from the middle themselves. Many 
did not fall far, however (remember that 
even moving from the 31st percentile 
to the 29th is enough). Looking at the 
second measure of downward mobility, 28 
percent of adults also fell 20 percentiles 
or more below their parents’ rank (though 
of course, they were not exactly the same 
28 percent who moved down by the first 
measure). Finally, 19 percent of adults had 
income at least 20 percent lower than that 
How Common is Downward 
Mobility from the Middle?
Chances of Downward Mobility from 
the Middle
Figure 2
NOTE: Dark bars indicate the effect is statistically significant at p<0.05. Model also controls for being Hispanic, living in one 
of four regions of the country and either in an urban or rural area in 1979, having used cocaine, having used marijuana at least 
10 times and having missing data on any of the variables. These variables did not consistently have substantive or statistical 
signficance across measures of downward mobility.
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What Drives Downward Mobility 
from the Middle?
measures reading comprehension, math 
knowledge, arithmetic reasoning and 
word knowledge. Studies have shown 
that AFQT scores correlate well with 
performance in the military, as well 
as with adult wages. It is important to 
note that beyond measuring a person’s 
human capital in the form of knowledge 
or cognitive skills, AFQT scores likely 
reflect a host of other factors that affect 
test performance not included here, such 
as motivation and self-confidence, which 
could also influence downward mobility.10  
Furthermore, AFQT scores are likely to be 
influenced by a range of outside factors, 
such as school quality, which are not 
accounted for in the models here because 
measures are unavailable.
Figures 3 to 5 illustrate how the 
probability of downward mobility is 
connected to family background, choice 
characteristics and AFQT scores.11  
Because these factors may affect men and 
women—and their mobility—differently, 
men and women are examined separately.  
Each chart shows the predicted likelihood 
of downward mobility associated with 
having one characteristic rather than 
another—after statistically accounting for 
This section investigates how a range of 
factors including several mobility drivers 
examined in past EMP research, such 
as parental income and education and 
individual education and family structure, 
affect downward mobility from the 
middle.7 The first set of factors consists 
of family background characteristics or 
those characteristics that do not reflect 
the youth’s own choices. These include 
whether one’s mother has a high school 
diploma, whether one’s father works in 
a professional or managerial occupation 
and the income percentile rank into 
which one’s family falls.8 The second 
set of characteristics includes choice 
characteristics, such as youth’s educational 
attainment and marital status, which in 
part reflect their own preferences as they 
move into adulthood.9 To explore the 
impact of potentially destructive decisions, 
drug use is included.
Additionally, youths’ percentile scores 
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) are included. Everyone in the 
NLSY-79 survey was asked to take the 
AFQT, a standardized test administered by 
the U.S. military to determine qualification 
for enlistment in the armed forces. It 
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Additional Chance of Falling From the Middle to the Bottom Associated 
with Individual Characteristics
Figure 3
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Additional Chance of Falling 20 Percentiles Below Parental Rank Associated 
with Individual Characteristics
Figure 4
NOTE FOR FIGURES 3 AND 4: Dark bars indicate the effect is statistically significant at p<0.05. Model also controls for being 
Hispanic, living in one of four regions of the country and either in an urban or rural area in 1979, having used cocaine, having 
used marijuana at least 10 times and having missing data on any of the variables. These variables did not consistently have 
substantive or statistical signficance across measures of downward mobility.
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Compared with married men, men who 
are divorced, widowed or separated are 13 
percentage points more likely to drop out 
of middle-class status, 8 percentage points 
more likely to drop at least 20 percentiles 
below their parents’ economic position 
and 9 percentage points more likely to 
have income that is at least 20 percent 
below the level of their parents.13 In part, 
this likely reflects the loss of a second 
income that often accompanies divorce 
or separation, though it is important to 
remember that incomes are adjusted for 
family size in these analyses.  
More strikingly, compared with married 
women, women who are divorced, 
widowed or separated are 31 to 36 
the impact of all the other factors. Many 
factors are strongly related to one another, 
making it difficult to tease out their 
individual importance. However, family 
structure, education and AFQT scores are 
consistently associated with downward 
mobility for both men and women, 
whereas drug use increases downward 
mobility among men.12
in general, being divorced 
and never having married are 
associated with downward 
mobility . the associations 
for women are stronger than 
for men, especially for being 
divorced .   
Additional Chance Real Income is 20 Percent or More Below Parents’ 
Income Associated with Individual Characteristics
Figure 5
NOTE: Dark bars indicate the effect is statistically significant at p<0.05. Model also controls for being Hispanic, living in one 
of four regions of the country and either in an urban or rural area in 1979, having used cocaine, having used marijuana at least 
10 times and having missing data on any of the variables. These variables did not consistently have substantive or statistical 
signficance across measures of downward mobility.
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having no more than a high 
school education is strongly 
correlated with downward 
mobility .  
Compared with those with no more than 
a high school education, women who 
attended or completed college are 9 and 
16 percentage points, respectively, less 
likely to drop out of the middle class as 
adults. The gaps are the same—9 and 
16 percentage points—when looking 
at the likelihood of income falling 20 
percent below one’s parents. Women 
with college degrees are 14 percentage 
points less likely to fall 20 percentiles 
or more below their parents’ levels than 
those with schooling at the high school 
level or below. Among men, having a 
college degree appears less important for 
downward mobility than it is for women, 
and having attended college at all is more 
important.
among men who were in the 
middle class as youth, using 
crack cocaine or heroin is 
associated with dramatic 
increases in downward 
mobility .
Unsurprisingly, these analyses suggest 
that one of the worst choices a middle-
class male youth can make with respect to 
future mobility is to use hard drugs. Male 
youth who have tried crack cocaine are 
percentage points more likely to be 
downwardly mobile, depending on the 
measure. Never-married women are 16 
to 19 percentage points more likely to 
be downwardly mobile than married 
women—also a stronger association than 
exists for men, who are 6 to 10 percentage 
points more likely to fall if they have 
never married.14  These gender differences 
likely are related to lower earnings among 
women than men.
Middle-class youth with 
lower afQt percentile 
scores are significantly more 
likely to be downwardly 
mobile than those with 
higher scores .  
This finding holds true across all three 
measures of mobility for both women and 
men. Scoring 20 percentiles lower on the 
AFQT increases the chances that a man 
or woman raised in a middle-class family 
will fall to lower-income status as an adult 
by about 6 percentage points. Similarly, 
a 20-percentile decline in AFQT scores 
is associated with a 5 percentage-point 
rise in the chance of falling 20 or more 
percentiles below one’s parents’ income 
rank, and a 6 percentage-point rise in the 
chance that income will be 20 percent or 
more below that of one’s parents.  
among men and women 
raised in middle-class homes, 
WHAT DRIVES DoWnWARD MoBIlITY fRoM THE MIDDlE?
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impact on women are never statistically 
different from zero—they are imprecisely 
measured, probably because of the small 
number of female drug users who start 
out in the middle class.16   
The next section explores racial and 
gender mobility gaps, but because of the 
imprecision of the estimates, it mostly 
considers how gaps are affected by groups 
of factors, such as family background and 
choice factors.
10 to 18 percentage points more likely 
to experience downward mobility than 
those who have not, and the figures for 
heroin are 19 to 26 percentage points.15  
Among women, the effects of hard drug 
use on downward mobility are harder to 
pin down. Figures 3 to 5 appear to show 
that heroin use among women actually 
protects against downward mobility, 
but that would be an inappropriate 
conclusion. The estimates for drugs’ 
WHAT DRIVES DoWnWARD MoBIlITY fRoM THE MIDDlE?
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african americans 
experience more downward 
mobility than whites . 
Figure 6 shows the likelihood that a 
person raised in a middle-class family will 
fall into a lower-income category as an 
adult. The leftmost set of bars indicate that 
blacks raised in middle-class families are 
significantly more likely (37 percent) than 
non-Hispanic whites (25 percent) to drop 
below the 30th income percentile as adults. 
Figure 7, showing the share of youth 
falling 20 percentiles or more below their 
parents’ income percentile, and Figure 8,  
showing the percent with income that 
is 20 percent or more below the level of 
their parents, reveal the same pattern. 
Differences between non-Hispanic whites 
and Hispanics are comparatively small 
and not statistically significant. Although 
differences between blacks and Hispanics 
appear bigger, these also fail to achieve 
statistical significance.
The previous section demonstrated 
the effects of various personal and 
background characteristics on downward 
mobility from the middle for men and 
women separately. However, because 
whites, blacks and Hispanics often look 
different along these and a number of 
other dimensions, as do men and women, 
they have different rates of downward 
mobility, which is not conveyed by 
Figures 3 to 5. This section, therefore, 
turns to the question of downward 
mobility differences by race and sex. 
Across the three mobility measures, 
three main findings are apparent. First, 
consistent with previous EMP research, 
African Americans experience significantly 
more downward mobility than whites, 
regardless of the measure used. Second, 
the differences in downward mobility by 
race are limited to differences between 
white and black men. Finally, the 
only notable gender gap in downward 
economic mobility is among whites.
How Does Downward Mobility 
from the Middle Differ Across 
Demographic Groups?
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Note for Figures 6 to 8: Tabulations from the NLSY-79. Sample comprises individuals who lived in middle-class families in 
1979-1980 who were between the ages of 14 and 17 in 1979 and 39-44 between 2004 and 2006. Middle class is defined as 
family income-to-needs ratios between the 30th and 70th percentiles of the income distribution.
* Indicates that the difference compared to whites is statistically significant— *p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01. 
† Indicates that the difference compared to men is statistically significant — † p< 0.05, †† p< 0.01. 
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Differences in downward 
mobility by race are limited 
to differences between 
white and black men; 
women of different races are 
equally likely to experience 
downward mobility . 
The share of black men who fall out of 
middle-class status is nearly twice as high 
as the share of white men who do so (38 
percent versus 21 percent). Hispanic men 
also appear more likely than white men to 
drop out of the middle as adults, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
Across the three measures of mobility, 
white, black and Hispanic women 
experience similar rates of downward 
mobility from the middle, and the 
differences among them are not statistically 
significant.  
the gender gap in 
downward mobility from 
the middle is only present 
among whites . 
Only among whites are women more 
downwardly mobile than men: Thirty 
percent versus 21 percent in Figure 6, and 
a gap equally sizable in Figures 7 and 8, 
all of which are statistically significant.  
In fact, black women consistently show 
less downward mobility than black men, 
although the difference is never statistically 
meaningful. Hispanic men and women 
have nearly identical chances of falling 
from the middle.  
HoW DoES DoWnWARD MoBIlITY fRoM THE MIDDlE DIffER ACRoSS DEMoGRApHIC GRoUpS?
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in backgrounds, characteristics and test 
scores investigated here. 
The first step to explaining differences 
in dropping from the middle by race 
and gender is to see how the family 
and personal characteristics of men and 
women of different races vary (see Table 
1). These comparisons suggest that, on 
net, white men and women raised in 
middle-class families are advantaged 
relative to their black and Hispanic 
counterparts. The differences between 
white and black men, especially with 
regard to their educational attainment, 
their likelihood of being married, their 
test scores and their fathers’ occupation, 
are particularly large. Differences between 
white and black women also are large, 
except that they have similar education 
levels. Hispanics tend to fall between 
whites and blacks for both sexes, with the 
exceptions of mothers’ education and their 
own education.
It is important to note that a factor can 
be important for explaining downward 
mobility in general without it being 
important for explaining the black-white 
gap among men or the male-female gap 
among whites. For instance, having high 
AFQT scores might promote mobility 
for both men and women, but if men 
and women have similar test scores, then 
it will not explain mobility differences 
between them. The analyses in this section 
assess the extent to which differences 
in downward mobility by race and 
gender are accounted for by observable 
differences in individuals’ backgrounds 
and characteristics. Among men raised 
in middle-income families, the gap in 
downward mobility between whites and 
blacks is substantially reduced when 
those observable differences are taken into 
account, with differences in test scores 
playing a prominent role. Among whites 
raised in middle-income families, the 
male-female gap in downward mobility 
cannot be accounted for by differences 
Explaining Racial and Gender 
Differences in Downward Mobility 
from the Middle
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Parent Characteristics
Mother has at least a high school diploma 68% 64% 42% 67% 59% 44%
father’s occupation is professional/managerial 21% 3% 16% 23% 5% 9%
Average family rank in income distribution: 1979 50.5 47.7 50.2 50.9 46.5 49.1
Individual Characteristics
Has high school diploma 93% 95% 90% 96% 98% 91%
Has a college degree 27% 15% 17% 24% 22% 18%
Married 65% 45% 63% 67% 48% 62%
Has never married 13% 35% 19% 6% 23% 13%
Is divorced/widowed/separated 23% 21% 18% 27% 29% 25%
10+ lifetime uses of marijuana 42% 40% 45% 27% 12% 15%
Used cocaine 32% 29% 29% 22% 9% 16%
Used crack 7% 12% 7% 7% 6% 4%
Used heroin 2% 4% 4% 1% 2% 0%
Average AfQT percentile 46.4 21.7 36.3 45.5 27.5 32.8
note:  tabulations from the nlsy-79 . sample comprises people who lived in middle-class families in 1979-1980 who were 
between the ages of 14 and 17 in 1979 and 39-44 between 2004 and 2006 . Middle class is defined as family income-to-
needs ratios between the 30th and 70th percentiles of the income distribution . sample sizes: 386 white men, 113 black men, 
89 hispanic men, 366 white women, 123 black women, 112 hispanic women .
Hispanic women relative to men seem 
less impressive than their advantages on 
the characteristics here would predict.  
The only real disadvantage women 
starting in the middle seem to have 
relative to men is that they are more 
likely to be divorced.17
By using statistical models that estimate 
the effect of each factor on downward 
mobility differences, holding the other 
factors constant, it is possible to explore 
more deeply the sources of group 
differences in downward mobility.
These differences in family and 
personal characteristics by race and 
sex are consistent with the findings 
on downward mobility: The greatest 
differences in these characteristics are 
between white and black men, and this is 
the only pair for whom intergenerational 
downward mobility rates differ 
significantly. Based on the characteristics 
here, downward mobility differences 
between white men and women are 
unexplained (because they look so similar 
across the range of factors considered), 
and the mobility outcomes of black and 
Characteristics of Men and Women Who Started in the Middle Class
MEN WOMEN
WHITE BLACK HISPANIC WHITE BLACK HISPANIC
Table 1
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characteristics—on which black and white 
men might differ. Those differences might 
in turn explain the average downward 
mobility gap between the two groups.  
Investigating one set of factors at a time 
is a way to see whether black and white 
men who are identical in terms of all the 
factors considered still differ in terms of 
their downward mobility. If adding a set of 
factors to the analysis reduces the black-
white mobility gap, then differences in 
those factors help explain what is driving 
disparities in downward mobility from the 
middle.18 
Differences in average 
test scores are the most 
important observable racial 
difference in accounting for 
the downward mobility gap 
between black and white 
men .
Figure 9 shows how the gap in 
downward mobility between black and 
white men changes when taking into 
account the factors explored above—
family background and individual 
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Figure 9
Black Men’s Additional Chances of Downward Mobility Versus White Men’s
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Note: Tabulations from the NLSY-79. Sample comprises individuals who lived in middle-class families in 1979-1980 who were 
between the ages of 14 and 17 in 1979 and 39-44 between 2004 and 2006. Middle class is defined as family income-to-needs 
ratios between the 30th and 70th percentiles of the income distribution.
* Indicates that the difference compared to whites is statistically significant  - * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 .
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The steadily shrinking bars in each panel 
of Figure 9 indicate that after taking 
AFQT scores into account, along with the 
family background and choice factors, 
the black-white downward mobility 
gap among men is smaller by 49 to 62 
percent, depending on the mobility 
measure. The fact that the gaps are no 
longer statistically distinguishable from 
zero means that these factors may explain 
the entire gap. And AFQT scores are the 
single biggest predictor of black-white 
differences in downward mobility from 
the middle class among these factors.19
Differences in downward 
mobility between white 
men and women are mostly 
unrelated to the factors 
considered in this report .
Figure 10 shows how the downward 
mobility gaps between white men and 
women change as different sets of factors 
are statistically controlled. In stark 
contrast to the black-white male gaps 
in Figure 9, the white male-female gaps 
in Figure 10 do not decline by much, 
even when the full set of factors included 
in this report are controlled, and they 
remain statistically significant.20
Given that the factors considered can 
account for a substantial portion of the 
racial gaps among men, it is striking how 
unrelated white gender gaps are to the 
As illustrated in Figure 9, the findings 
are consistent across the three measures 
of downward mobility: Even after 
controlling for differences in family 
backgrounds, locations and choices, 
black men raised in middle-class families 
still are significantly more likely to be 
downwardly mobile than white men 
raised in middle-class families. The 
top-most bar in Figure 9, for example, 
shows the black-white difference in the 
probability that a man who was in the 
middle class as a youth falls out of the 
middle in adulthood.  Before taking 
other characteristics into account, black 
men raised in middle-class families 
are 17 percentage points more likely 
to be downwardly mobile than white 
men (the gap shown in Figure 6). The 
second bar in the top-most set shows 
what happens to the gap when controls 
for family background characteristics 
are added to the analysis. After taking 
differences in family background into 
account, the black-white difference falls 
to 16 percentage points. Accounting for 
choices reduces the gap to 11 percentage 
points. In other words, all of these factors 
combined provide part of the explanation 
for the different rates of downward 
mobility between black and white men, 
but a sizable unexplained gap remains.  
Adding AFQT scores to the model, 
however, reduces black-white differences 
in downward mobility so that the two 
rates are statistically indistinguishable. 
the pew Charitable trUsts20
might account for much of the downward 
mobility gaps between white men and 
white women. Whatever is behind the 
gender gap among whites, it is likely to be 
a different set of factors than those behind 
the racial gap among men.
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Note: Tabulations from the NLSY-79. Sample comprises individuals who lived in middle-class families in 1979-1980 who were 
between the ages of 14 and 17 in 1979 and 39-44 between 2004 and 2006. Middle class is defined as family income-to-needs 
ratios between the 30th and 70th percentiles of the income distribution.
* Indicates that the difference compared to whites is statistically significant  - * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 .
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diverse factors considered. A reasonable 
speculation is that differences in labor 
market factors (occupations chosen, hours 
worked, years of experience at a given 
age and hourly pay for a given job) and 
in family structure (single parenthood) 
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adulthood, double the number of white 
men who do so. In contrast, there is not 
a notable gap in downward mobility 
between white and Hispanic men, nor 
between women of different races.  
The findings presented here raise several 
important questions for future research. 
Because AFQT scores explain a large 
portion of the black-white difference in 
downward intergenerational mobility, it 
is important to better understand why 
AFQT scores differ so substantially, 
even among youth raised in middle-
class families. The scope of factors that 
AFQT could be reflecting, beyond a 
person’s human capital potential or 
academic ability, also needs to be better 
understood. Further, future research 
should explore why racial and ethnic 
differences in downward intergenerational 
mobility are confined to men and not 
women.  
Finally, this report leaves open the 
question of why white women are more 
downwardly mobile than white men. 
A key element of the American Dream is 
that each generation will exceed the living 
standards and economic position of the 
one that came before it. At the very least, 
parents—especially in the middle class—
want to ensure that their own economic 
position will transfer to their children.   
Nonetheless, consistent with previous 
work by EMP, this report demonstrates 
that about one quarter of children raised 
in middle-class families are downwardly 
mobile as adults, a finding that persists 
across three definitions of downward 
mobility. The educational attainment, 
family structure and test scores of men 
and women appear to be strong drivers of 
downward economic mobility for initially 
middle-class Americans.
However, a more notable and troubling 
finding from this and other research is 
the stark contrast in downward mobility 
rates between whites and blacks, and 
in particular between white and black 
men. This report shows that nearly 40 
percent of black men raised in middle-
class families fall from the middle in 
Conclusion
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ConClUSIon
gender-specific factors are important for 
mobility. Even when confining analyses 
to black and white men, up to half of the 
downward mobility gap is unaccounted 
for by the factors considered here. These 
findings highlight the importance of 
continued research into the drivers of 
downward mobility, how they might 
differ across groups and how they might 
vary from the drivers of upward mobility.
The striking lack of correspondence 
between the factors affecting racial 
gaps in mobility among men and the 
factors affecting gender gaps among 
whites highlights the complicated 
nature of economic mobility. The fact 
that black and Hispanic women also 
appear advantaged relative to their 
male counterparts, yet do not have less 
downward mobility, also suggests that 
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Appendix
MEN
black 0 .059809 0 .062674 0 .074435
 ( .0544132) ( .0526263) ( .0500612)
hispanic 0 .044624 0 .048453 0 .032809
 ( .0537959) ( .0531297) ( .0480597)
Mother graduated high school -0 .0299 -0 .05833 -0 .04565
 ( .0451668) ( .0456984) ( .0400189)
Mother without high school Diploma -0 .0751 -0 .12599 -0 .05345
 ( .0878942) ( .0814461) ( .0754947)
father professional/Manager -0 .06873 -0 .06071 -0 .00816
 ( .0421091) ( .0438483) ( .0386112)
father not in professional occupation -0 .02842 -0 .03764 -0 .01793
 ( .0493095) ( .0453886) ( .0413799)
1979 family income rank -0 .00066 0 .007614 0 .002942
 ( .0014985) ( .0014479) ( .00128)
lived in northeastern City -0 .09145 -0 .08432 0 .001673
 ( .1036279) ( .089274) ( .089885)
north Central City -0 .02504 -0 .05115 0 .035946
 ( .0890715) ( .0840082) ( .0788161)
north Central, not in City 0 .018907 -0 .00611 0 .016841
 ( .0589251) ( .060387) ( .0492161)
southern City 0 .021115 0 .016758 -0 .01443
 ( .1240681) ( .1004041) ( .0920716)
south, not in City 0 .000882 0 .022583 0 .049417
 ( .0614843) ( .0640848) ( .0535433)
western City -0 .00951 -0 .03782 -0 .1106
 ( .0967347) ( .096651) ( .0550827)
west, not in City 0 .038201 -0 .02295 0 .018956
 ( .066724) ( .0662019) ( .0555794)
Modeling results for figures 3 to 5 (explaining the Causes  
of individual Downward Mobility)
ols regression Coefficients, with standard errors in Parentheses
Out of middle-class 
status (below 30th 
percentile)
Rank is 20 or more 
percentiles below 
parents’ rank
Real income is 20% 
or more below 
parents’ income
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black -0 .02727 0 .00519 -0 .01004
 ( .0542782) ( .0528899) ( .049182)
hispanic -0 .06009 -0 .02238 -0 .03045
 ( .0535681) ( .0543364) ( .049527)
Mother graduated high school -0 .04422 -0 .0131 -0 .01244
 ( .0429833) ( .0420451) ( .0390143)
Mother without high school Diploma 0 .015582 0 .09067 0 .106586
 ( .1224497) ( .1364204) ( .1152161)
father professional/Manager -0 .01253 -0 .03222 -0 .02376
 ( .049132) ( .047679) ( .0418255)
father not in professional occupation -0 .02573 -0 .00275 -0 .04103
 ( .0607058) ( .054946) ( .0499059)
WOMEN
Out of middle-class 
status (below 30th 
percentile)
Rank is 20 or more 
percentiles below 
parents’ rank
Real income is 20% 
or more below 
parents’ income
region or City Missing -0 .1355 -0 .27603 -0 .17912
 ( .116787) ( .0673124) ( .0593596)
some College -0 .13059 -0 .15454 -0 .07394
 ( .0422372) ( .0429476) ( .035866)
College graduate -0 .07472 -0 .13204 -0 .0501
 ( .0453155) ( .0459726) ( .035381)
never Married 0 .099885 0 .095535 0 .060695
 ( .0484097) ( .0490901) ( .040473)
Divorced, widowed, sep . 0 .129583 0 .084559 0 .094421
 ( .0491784) ( .0467579) ( .0433222)
Used Marijuana 10+ times -0 .01031 -0 .02079 0 .026179
 ( .0450417) ( .0431814) ( .0403333)
Used Crack Cocaine 0 .144844 0 .18075 0 .106491
 ( .0851293) ( .0824937) ( .0812122)
Used powder Cocaine 0 .069461 0 .040906 0 .047555
 ( .0518451) ( .0493978) ( .046725)
Used heroin 0 .262137 0 .1932 0 .194766
 ( .1122981) ( .1268499) ( .1423163)
Drug Use Missing 0 .224225 0 .07533 0 .172945
 ( .0843952) ( .0793352) ( .080532)
afQt percentile score -0 .00306 -0 .00248 -0 .00189
 ( .0007888) ( .0007831) ( .0006588)
afQt score Missing 0 .237882 0 .164023 0 .160922
 ( .1653492) ( .1324256) ( .1408019)
Constant 0 .3739 0 .019583 0 .047166
 ( .1064742) ( .0994021) ( .0873717)
Out of middle-class 
status (below 30th 
percentile)
Rank is 20 or more 
percentiles below 
parents’ rank
Real income is 20% 
or more below 
parents’ income
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1979 family income rank -0 .00185 0 .010339 0 .004266
 ( .0015568) ( .001467) ( .0013474)
lived in northeastern City 0 .087857 0 .082886 0 .055236
 ( .1722767) ( .1603668) ( .1523797)
north Central City -0 .12664 -0 .01691 0 .013123
 ( .1107818) ( .1084472) ( .1090926)
north Central, not in City 0 .005828 0 .061238 0 .00255
 ( .0638172) ( .0605467) ( .0558175)
southern City -0 .04909 0 .033201 -0 .07437
 ( .0863909) ( .0936863) ( .0773622)
south, not in City 0 .015218 0 .054196 0 .030711
 ( .0665053) ( .061652) ( .0585146)
western City -0 .04404 -0 .06957 -0 .01571
 ( .1292623) ( .136347) ( .1340688)
west, not in City -0 .03904 -0 .03133 -0 .01412
 ( .0790885) ( .0704638) ( .0667849)
region or City Missing -0 .00306 0 .113051 -0 .19495
 ( .1732173) ( .1449294) ( .1241349)
some College -0 .0946 -0 .03057 -0 .08569
 ( .0482181) ( .0472551) ( .0432292)
College graduate -0 .16338 -0 .13748 -0 .16134
 ( .0480604) ( .0484432) ( .0391828)
never Married 0 .175752 0 .164823 0 .185539
 ( .0672245) ( .0676648) ( .0647703)
Divorced, widowed, sep . 0 .357515 0 .356422 0 .305625
 ( .0487021) ( .0475358) ( .0462921)
Used Marijuana 10+ times -0 .0439 -0 .0151 -0 .03489
 ( .0560645) ( .0536151) ( .0503491)
Used Crack Cocaine 0 .128372 0 .123807 -0 .00413
 ( .0886663) ( .0931046) ( .0821524)
Used powder Cocaine 0 .083478 0 .067403 0 .058228
 ( .0631894) ( .0629498) ( .0563851)
Used heroin -0 .15941 -0 .11473 -0 .12654
 ( .2341077) ( .1669656) ( .217134)
Drug Use Missing 0 .072953 0 .115473 0 .156656
 ( .0984604) ( .1065179) ( .0993843)
afQt percentile score -0 .0032 -0 .00234 -0 .00211
 ( .0009806) ( .0009827) ( .0008756)
afQt score Missing 0 .071975 -0 .15629 -0 .03984
 ( .1164945) ( .0655385) ( .0607658)
Constant 0 .517406 -0 .224 0 .052567
 ( .1177215) ( .0993324) ( .0911937)
Out of middle-class 
status (below 30th 
percentile)
Rank is 20 or more 
percentiles below 
parents’ rank
Real income is 20% 
or more below 
parents’ income
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6 Again, this varies from Isaacs, Sawhill, and Haskins, 
2008, which considers youth who drop into the 
bottom income quintile (below the 20th percentile) to 
be downwardly mobile. 
7 See Isaacs, Sawhill and Haskins, 2008; Haskins, 
Holzer and Lerman, 2009; and DeLeire and Lopoo, 
2010.
8 That youth raised in married-parent families fare 
better on a host of socioeconomic outcomes as adults 
than youth in single-parent families, even after taking 
income differences into account, is well-established 
in the literature (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). 
Here, however, the population of interest is selected 
on income—only those youth raised in middle-class 
families are included. As such, the youth from single-
parent families who are nonetheless middle class might 
have intangible personal and family assets that allow 
their families to attain middle-class status and might 
guard against downward mobility. In contrast, youth 
from two-parent families that do not achieve higher-
income status (i.e., they are middle class) might have 
intangible personal and family liabilities that might 
contribute to downward mobility. This selection into 
the middle-class sample contributes to a perverse 
finding when youth family structure is included in the 
regression models: being raised in a two-parent family 
contributes to downward mobility, particularly among 
whites. Similar selection-driven findings are reported 
by Mazumder (2008) and Hertz (2004).  Rather than 
include a measure of family structure in this descriptive 
model and implying that blacks are protected against 
downward mobility because they are more likely to 
come from single-mother families, the models here 
exclude family structure. Excluding family structure 
has negligible effects on the other included variables.  
1 Middle class is a social construct that reflects 
occupational status, education and income among 
other factors. For ease of explanation in this report, 
however, the term “middle class” is used solely as a 
description of income status.
2 Economic Mobility Project, 2009. When asked to 
rank various definitions of the American Dream on 
a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 describing the American 
Dream perfectly, respondents ranked “your children 
being better off financially than you” as 7.8 out of 10.
3 See Endnote 1.
4 The NLSY-79 began with a cohort of more than 
12,000 youth ages 14-21 in 1979, re-interviewing 
them annually through 1994 and biennially since 
then, gathering data on employment, income, family 
formation, schooling and risk-taking behaviors. In the 
early waves of the survey, data on family background 
and parents were also collected. The sample of youth 
from middle-class families who appear in the NLSY 
as adults in 2004/2006 comprises 1,189 observations. 
The number of whites, blacks and Hispanics are 752, 
236, and 201, respectively. There are 588 men and 
601 women; among whites there are 386 men and 366 
women; among blacks, there are 113 men and 123 
women; and among Hispanics, there are 89 men and 
112 women. Attrition from the NLSY for youth raised 
in middle-class families does not substantially alter the 
weighted characteristics of our analysis sample.
5 Two years of data are used at each point in time to 
average out variation in annual income. Because the 
NLSY asks about income received in the previous year, 
the analyses compare parents’ income in 1978 and 
1979 with their adult children’s income in 2003 and 
2005.
Endnotes
factors are inconsistently or weakly associated with 
downward mobility, or are imprecisely estimated. See 
the Appendix for full regression estimates.
12 The results in this section are based on linear 
probability models that control for whether one’s 
mother has a high school diploma, whether one’s 
father is a professional or manager, one’s parents’ 
income rank in 1979 and one’s AFQT percentile score. 
They also include a full set of dummies for central-
city residence and region; dummies for race/ethnicity, 
educational attainment, marital status, and drug use; 
and dummies for missing data on mother’s education, 
father’s occupation, region/central-city residence, drug 
use, and AFQT scores. Figures 3 to 5 do not show 
variables that are not consistently substantively or 
statistically significant across the different models. Full 
details and results of the modeling are presented in the 
Appendix.
13 These differences are statistically significant at 
a level of p<0.05, except for falling 20 percentiles 
(p=0.07).
14 The p values for men are 0.052 for falling 20 
percentiles and 0.134 for falling 20 percent. All other 
differences noted are statistically significant at a level of 
p<0.05.
15 In terms of falling from the middle class, the 
estimated effect of heroin is statistically significant at 
the p<0.05 level while the p value for crack is 0.089. 
For dropping 20 percentiles, the estimated effect of 
crack is statistically significant while the p value 
for heroin is 0.128. Neither crack nor heroin has a 
statistically significant effect on dropping 20 percent.
16 There are only six women in the sample who have 
used heroin, who are unlikely to be representative. 
Obtaining more reliable estimates would require a 
larger survey, which would result in a greater number 
of middle-class female drug users in the data who 
would be more representative of middle-class female 
drug users nationally.
17 Note that there are many other possible 
background and personal characteristics not 
considered in this report that could reveal stark 
9 Clearly the choice variables are not solely the result 
of choices made in a vacuum where children are 
unaffected by their experiences and opportunities.
10 Regarding motivation, it is notable that the youth in 
the NLSY had no incentive to try their hardest—or try 
at all—on the battery of tests that make up the AFQT. 
Analysis of the NLSY data has found a significant 
number of test takers received scores as low as would 
be predicted if they had randomly answered questions 
(or lower—see Fischer et al., 1996). Regarding self-
confidence, experimental research has shown that 
African Americans’ test performance suffers to the 
extent that they are anxious about confirming negative 
stereotypes. Their performance can be experimentally 
improved by, for instance, reassuring them that the 
test does not reflect intelligence. Even white test takers 
perform worse on a test if told that Asians typically 
outperform whites on it. See Steele (2010). Research 
suggests that the AFQT does not suffer from much 
racial bias in that it predicts labor market outcomes 
similarly for blacks and whites (Neal and Johnson, 
1996), but this is a separate issue from stereotype 
threat, which could operate in test taking, academic 
achievement and job performance to produce 
associations between test scores and future outcomes.
11 To preserve sample size, indicators for missing 
data are also included without imputing values for the 
missing ones. As such the variables of interest (e.g., 
mother has a high school degree or more) capture 
the effect of the variable (e.g., the difference between 
having a mother with and without a high school 
degree) and the missing information indicator (e.g., 
mother’s education unknown) adjusts for nonrandomly 
missing information as well as any effects of all the 
reasons that the variable was not reported (i.e., not 
knowing a mother’s education because she was absent 
from the family). No variable is missing more than 5.5 
percent of the time (weighted), but in some instances, 
those missing data for a specific variable might be 
extremely likely to be downwardly mobile—as 
such, the missing value indicators are occasionally 
statistically significant. For example, those who do 
not report information on drug use are significantly 
more likely to be downwardly mobile than those 
who report that they did not use drugs. Several other 
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EnDnoTES
most important factor behind black-white downward 
mobility differences. No other factor considered in 
this report had a statistically meaningful effect—or a 
substantively large effect—on any of the black-white 
mobility gaps among men, except that the gap in the 
likelihood of falling 20 percentiles would have been 
even larger if not for the fact that the parental family 
income rank of black men was lower on average 
than that of white men. Even more strikingly, the 
collective effect of the family background factors and 
of the choice factors was never statistically significant. 
Between 27 percent and 47 percent of the black-
white mobility gap among men is explained by black-
white differences in the means of the various factors 
included in the report. Of course, AFQT scores reflect 
family background and other influences to some 
extent, so it is not technically accurate to say that 
differences in cognitive skills, scholastic achievement 
or knowledge explain the gap.
20 Nor does estimating separate models for white 
men and women identify a single factor for which 
male-female average differences account for any part 
of any of the three mobility gaps.
differences between women and men. For example, 
years of work experience are not explored here, 
but doing so would likely go some way toward 
reconciling these findings, since women are more 
likely than men to spend time out of the labor force 
to raise children.
18 Technically, the analyses are based on stepwise 
OLS regression models that pool black and white 
men, in which groups of independent variables are 
iteratively added to an initial model that includes only 
an indicator variable for race.  
19 Using a statistical technique called a Oaxaca 
decomposition allows an explanation of the 
racial gap in downward mobility in terms of both 
racial differences in the means of the various 
factors themselves (for example, differences in 
college graduation rates) and racial differences in 
the association between background factors and 
downward mobility (for example, racial differences in 
how important having a college degree is for avoiding 
downward mobility). Consistent with the results in 
Figure 9, AFQT score differences appear to be the 
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